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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of introducing competition for local passenger railway markets in the
German state of Baden-Württemberg. We compare the evolution of the frequency of service on lines
that were exposed to competition for the market with lines procured by direct negotiations with the
incumbent. Our results suggest that the competitively procured lines enjoyed a stronger growth of the
frequency of service than those that were not procured competitively, even after controlling for various
line characteristics that might have had an independent influence on the frequency of service. Our
results further suggest that the effects of competition may depend strongly on the operator.
Exploring the Eﬀects of Competition for Railway Markets
Rafael Lalive, University of Zürich, CESifo and IZA
Armin Schmutzler*,University of Zürich, CEPR and ENCORE
This Version: 14/02/07
Abstract: This paper studies the eﬀects of introducing competition for local
passenger railway markets in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. We
compare the evolution of the frequency of service on lines that were exposed to
competition for the market with lines procured by direct negotiations with the
incumbent. Our results suggest that the competitively procured lines enjoyed
a stronger growth of the frequency of service than those that were not procured
competitively, even after controlling for various line characteristics that might
have had an independent influence on the frequency of service. Our results
further suggest that the eﬀects of competition may depend strongly on the
operator.
Keywords: Competition for the market, liberalization, passenger railways,
procurement auctions
JEL Classification: D43,D44,R48
–––––––––––––––––––––
*Corresponding author: University of Zürich, Socioeconomic Institute, Blümlisalp-
str. 10, CH-8006 Zürich; tel +41-44-634-22-71; fax +41-44-634-49-07. e-mail: armin-
sch@soi.unizh.ch.
We are grateful to Corinne Schmutz for research assistance. We also thank the editor,
David Martimort, two anonymous referees, Wolfgang Buchholz, Thomas Fischer,
Dennis Gärtner, Jürgen Müller, Markus Ksoll, Etienne de Villemeur and seminar
participants at the Third Conference on Railroad Industry Structure, Competition
and Investment in Stockholm, the IDEI/Institut Veolia Conference on Public Services
and Management in Toulouse, the STRC meeting in Locarno, the SGVS meeting
in Lugano and the Environmental Economics Group of the Verein für Socialpolitik
(Oldenburg) for helpful comments, without implicating them for the contents of this
paper.
1
1 Introduction
As a consequence of the railway reforms in the nineteen nineties, the former state
monopolies are facing increasing competition in many European countries. The
proponents of the reforms argue that this development will not only lead to de-
creasing transfer payments to railway operators, but also to better railway services.1
However, this opinion is not undisputed. First, there are serious arguments that
cast doubt on the hope that the potential eﬃciency gains from liberalisation in the
railway industry are similar to those in other sectors, most notably telecommuni-
cations.2 Second, it is not obvious that the institutional details in the liberalized
railway industry have been chosen in such a fashion that potential eﬃciency gains
are realized.3 From a-priori considerations, it is impossible to come to a definite con-
clusion regarding the pros and cons of liberalization as such, let alone the particular
institutions chosen in the diﬀerent European countries.
The empirical evaluation of the railway reforms is still in its infancy. A small
number of contributions deals with the eﬃciency eﬀects of various reforms in an
international context on a highly aggregate level (Cantos et al. 1999, Friebel et
al. 2003). Friebel et al. identify positive eﬃciency eﬀects of deregulation. Several
contributions analyze the outcomes of the U.K. reform (Cowie 2002, Pollitt and
Smith 2001), coming to more positive conclusions than the political debate in the
U.K. would suggest. Our contribution concentrates on a concrete measure, the
German Regionalisierungsgesetz, a law that was passed in 1993.4 This measure led
to a massive change in the procurement of regional passenger transportation. Even
though transfer payments from the central government are still used to finance
1Unsurprisingly, a particularly optimistic perspective on the potential eﬃciency gains from
competition comes from a report commissioned by MehrBahnen, an organisation of competitors
of the German state enterprise Deutsche Bahn (pspc 2004). The report estimates the potential
reduction in subsidies from relying on competitive mechanisms for procuring regional passenger
services at 18-38%, depending on the type of service.
2For instance, there is no reason to expect similar technological improvements as in the tele-
coms sector, as the railroad technology is comparatively mature. Also, as argued by Pittman
(2005), compared to other sectors, the cost share of the potentially competitive sector is smaller
for railways.
3For instance, there is no consensus as to the right extent of vertical separation. Also, it is not
obvious how access prices should best be regulated, for instance in view of the implied investment
incentives for network owners and operators. In the case of the British reform, both issues were
hotly debated (see, e.g. Bühler et al. 2004).
4Oﬃcially, the law is known as Gesetz zur Regionalisierung des öﬀentlichen Personen-
nahverkehrs. It was passed on December 27, 1993 as Article 4 of the Eisenbahnneuordnungsgesetz,
which contains most of the legal foundations for the German railway reform.
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short-distance trains and other forms of public transport, the role of the central
state for procurement is indirect. Each year, it distributes a substantial amount
of money (around five billion Euro in each year between 1997 and 2004) to the 16
states (Länder) who are now responsible for the procurement of regional passenger
transport, and railway services in particular.5 The states, in turn, delegated this
task to newly founded agencies. These agencies are now allowed to use competitive
franchising to procure the services, which typically means that firms bid in transfers
demanded to carry out the required service obligations, with the lowest bidder having
to supply the service in return for the demanded transfer. Importantly, however,
agencies are not obliged to use such competitive procedures. On 20-25% of the
passenger railway lines in Germany, a substantial part of local passenger services is
now procured in a (more or less) competitive fashion. On the remaining lines all
services are still provided by the incumbent without any competition for the market.
Typically, the service provider in these cases is DB Regio, a subsidiary of Deutsche
Bahn AG, the successor of the former state monopolist; in much rarer cases, some
other company carries out the service without having obtained the franchise in a
competitive fashion.6
While DB Regio is still the dominant operator ten years after the reforms were
introduced, its competitors, the NE-operators,7 have expanded their market share in
Germany from about 3% at the beginning of the reform to 13.2% in 2004 (DB AG
2005).8 Moreover, in cases where competitive bidding is applied, the competitors are
successful at least as often as DB Regio (Lalive and Schmutzler 2006), suggesting
that in the medium term this operator’s dominance may well belong to the past.9
The paper explores whether competition for the market has had a positive eﬀect
on the performance of passenger railways. We concentrate on the state of Baden-
5The development of the yearly transfer payments is reported in Deutsche Bahn (2003). Note,
however, that only about 80% of the payments are devoted exclusively to rail services as some of
the money is used for other activities such as infrastructure investments and for other modes of
transport..
6As will be laid out in Section 2, a considerable number of small operators were already active
before the railway reform.
7“NE” refers to “nicht bundeseigen”, that is, not belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany.
The term contains both privately owned firms and firms that belong to the public sector (e.g., firms
that are owned by local authorities).
8This market share is expressed in terms of the services supplied (train kilometers). In terms
of patronage, the competitors’ market share is still below 6%.
9It should be noted, however, that there is a recent tendency for agencies to write long-term
contracts with DB Regio which put limits on the extent to which competitive bidding will be used
in the future. For instance, in Baden-Württemberg such a contract was signed in 2003 (Stuttgarter
Nachrichten 2003).
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Württemberg, one of the largest German states, where the fraction of railway lines
that have been exposed to competition is well above average. Apart from the fact
that this restriction in the scope of the analysis simplifies the task of data collec-
tion, focusing on one state has the additional advantage of reducing within-sample
heterogeneity.
Economic theory provides two reasons why it should be possible with competitive
bidding to achieve any desired service level with lower transfer payments. First,
competition puts pressure on firms to enter low bids; second, it helps to select
the most eﬃcient supplier. The partial introduction of competition in Germany
greatly simplifies identifying the eﬀects of competition, because we can compare the
evolution of the performance on the competitive and the non-competitive segment of
the market. However, the data situation is far from perfect. Ideally, one would like
to use a variable as a performance measure that takes both the costs and benefits of
providing railway service into account, such as transfer payments per train kilometer
or preferably per passenger kilometer. Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain data
on the evolution of transfer payments at the level of individual lines. Instead, our
analysis attempts to clarify whether the development of the service level for the
competitively procured lines has been more favorable than for the remaining lines,
where the service level is defined as the frequency of service on the railway line under
consideration.10
Using self-collected data from the years 1994 and 2004, we show that the fre-
quency of service on those lines that were procured competitively developed more
favorably than on those that were not. There also appears to be some evidence for
a relation between the evolution of the frequency of service and the operator of the
line. On the one hand, NE-operated non-competitive lines tend to growmore rapidly
than the corresponding lines operated by DB Regio. On the other hand, while the
additional eﬀect of competition is strong and significant for DB Regio, it is mixed for
the NE-operators. For the largest NE-operator, the Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft
(AVG) near Karlsruhe, the competition eﬀect is very strong, whereas the remaining
lines with NE-operators do not develop much diﬀerently than their counterparts
that did not face competition.
Obviously, from the fact that we identify a positive relation between competi-
tion and growth of the service level one should not jump to the conclusion that
competition is the cause of these eﬀects. Clearly, our analysis does not preclude the
possibility that the faster growth on the competitively procured lines arises merely
10See Section 3 for a discussion of this definition.
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because agencies systematically spent more money on them than on the remaining
lines. Based on our explorative analysis, it is impossible to rule out this possibility.
However, an alternative interpretation is that agencies demand more of the potential
contractors when they use competitive bidding than when they face a monopolist,
because they are confident that they will get these services for a relatively low level
of transfer payments. Our analysis does not allow us to fully discriminate between
the two alternatives, but at least the notion that agencies expect to pay less when
they face competition is consistent with the experience from other countries.11 It
also fits well with pieces of information that leak out from the industry.12
Another obvious argument against our conclusion that competition has beneficial
eﬀects relates to reverse causality. In principle, agencies may be inclined to procure
those lines competitively that have greater growth potential than others.13 Though
we cannot fully rule out this possibility, we try to control for influence factors other
than the mode of procurement which might relate to the growth potential of the
line. Most importantly, we consider population growth as such a factor. Even
though population growth has a modest eﬀect on the change in the frequency of
service, including the variable does not lead to a substantial change of our predicted
competition eﬀect. This at least provides some support for the notion that the
competition eﬀect is not a pure selection eﬀect.
Finally, even leaving aside the issue of the causal relation between competition
and service growth, one might debate whether the changes are positive from a welfare
point of view. Most importantly, theoretical considerations would suggest that the
increased frequency of service associated with privatization and competition might
come at the cost of lower non-contractible quality. In the concluding section, we
argue that such well-taken concerns are presumably relatively unimportant in the
concrete example.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we shall sketch
some institutional background and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
11Pollitt and Smith (2001) and Alexandersson and Hultén (2005) both argue that franchising
led to lower subsidies in the U.K. and Sweden, respectively.
12For instance, according to BDI-Drucksache (2006), competitive procurement of the Ostküsten-
netz in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in 2005 was associated with a reduction in transfer
payments from around 30 mio. Euro to 23 mio. Euro.
13Using the telecommunications industry as an example, Duso and Röller (2003) argue that
treating policy as exogenous may lead to estimates of competition eﬀects that are biased upwards.
Policy endogenity is addressed more generally by Krozner and Strahan (1999) and Besley and Case
(2000). Though there is a possibility of endogeneity in our context, the problem is mitigated by
the fact that we control for the agencies who take the decisions, so that diﬀerent political ideologies
are unlikely to bias the results.
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methods and the data set. In Section 4, we present our econometric results. Section
5 concludes and discusses the approach in more detail.
2 Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Institutional Background
As in most other European countries, the railways in post-war Germany were essen-
tially run by state monopolies until the early nineteen nineties. In West Germany,
Deutsche Bundesbahn owned most of the infrastructure and, at the same time, was
the dominant operator for passenger and freight services. In addition, there were
several minor railroad companies (NE-Bahnen) that were typically also vertically in-
tegrated and carried out freight and/or passenger transportation on small networks.
In East Germany, Deutsche Reichsbahn was the integrated operator of the railway
system.
Major reforms of the railway system were introduced in Germany in the nineteen
nineties. These reforms were induced by the EU-directive 91/440, but there was also
some internal pressure to introduce changes to the system. First, after reunification,
there was the obvious issue of integrating the East and West German railways.
Second, the cumulated debt of the two state railways was immense, amounting to
67 bio. Deutschmarks in 1993 (Greﬀrath and Lingenthal 1994).
On January 1, 1994, the railway reform became eﬀective. Apart from creating
Deutsche Bahn AG as a successor of Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichs-
bahn, the reform had several elements that were familiar from other countries. First,
though Deutsche Bahn AG is generally regarded as a vertically integrated com-
pany, distinct sub-organisations were introduced at the upstream level (DB Netz for
the network and DB Station & Service for the stations) and the downstream level
(DB Regio for regional passenger transportation, DB Reise und Touristik for long-
distance passenger services andDB Cargo for freight). Thus, at least a move into the
direction of vertical separation was made.14 Second, even though the infrastructure
is still mostly operated by the former state monopolist, some degree of competition
was introduced on the downstream sector. Infrastructure owners, in particular DB
Netz, are required to allow freight operators and long-distance passenger operators
14In 1999, this separation was taken one step further. Deutsche Bahn AG then became a holding
company, consisting of five corporations.
6
access onto their network.15 With respect to local passenger services, an entirely
diﬀerent avenue was pursued. Essentially, the reforms led to the introduction of
competition for the market.16
More specifically, as a consequence of the railway reform, the Länder have
created agencies whose task it is to procure local passenger services. In Baden-
Württemberg, the most important agency is the Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Baden-
Württemberg (NVBW); in addition, the Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Neckar (VRN) and
the Verkehrs- und Tarifverbund Raum Stuttgart (VVS) are in charge of the services
in the agglomerations of Heidelberg/Mannheim and Stuttgart, respectively.
These agencies have considerable freedom in the way that they procure services.
At one extreme, they can still negotiate directly with the incumbent supplier, with-
out contacting any potential competitors. At the other extreme, they can resort to a
formal tender. The extent to which this possibility is used varies considerably across
agencies and so do the details of the procedure. In the simplest case, the agency
specifies detailed requirements about the level of service quality that it expects. The
specifications include the frequency of service, the rolling stock, the prices charged
to customers, etc.17 The contractors’ bids are the subsidy levels required to carry
out the expected services.18 The successful bidder receives his required transfer and
obtains the franchise for a period of typically 5-10 years. He then becomes the
residual claimant for the operating profits of the line.19
Diﬀerences in contractors’ bids reflect both diﬀerences in their relative eﬃciencies
and in the quality of the estimations of the value of the franchise, which is driven
15In practice, access is negligible for long-distance passenger trains, but substantial for freight
trains.
16Competition for the passenger market also plays a role in Sweden and the U.K. and to a much
lesser extent in the Netherlands.
17In Germany, regional public transport organisations (Verkehrsverbünde) coordinate timetables,
prices etc. on a substantial part of the network. In some cases, but my no means always, these
organisations are identical with the agencies that procure services; often they are entirely separate
institutions. Either way, the freedom of railway operators to set prices is limited by the existence
of the public transport organisations.
18In typical textbook treatments of competition for the market (Viscusi et al. 2000), the proce-
dure is slightly diﬀerent. Contractors do not bid the required subsidy. Instead, they bid the price
they want to charge to consumers and the lowest bid wins (Demsetz 1968).
19This description corresponds to so-called net contracts. Alternatively, the agencies sometimes
use gross contracts where the agencies receive the revenues, but the firms are residual claimants of
cost savings. There are also cases where the specifications of the auction are less detailed, leaving
some scope for the contractors to compete in other dimensions than the required subsidies. As the
exact weighting of the diﬀerent dimensions is typically left unspecified, the allocation mechanism
is closer to a “beauty contest” than to multi-dimensional auction in the sense of Che (1993) and
Branco (1997).
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for instance by the expected number of passengers. Thus, the auction has a private-
value component as well as a common-value component. For this reason, it is not
necessarily clear that the successful bid will come from the most eﬃcient firm. The
winner may simply have overestimated the potential gains from the market. To
our knowledge, there is only one obvious case of competitive bidding in the German
railway market where this kind of “winner’s curse” phenomenon played an important
role: The winner of an auction for the line Hamburg-Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein
was the newly founded FlexVerkehrs AG that went bankrupt within a year after
taking up the service in 2002 (derFahrgast 2003).20
As a result of the introduction of competition for the market, the market share of
DB Regio’s competitors has grown substantially. The pool of competitors consists
of several types of firms. First, the above-mentioned pre-reform NE-operators play
an important role. These firms typically still own their old infrastructure, but they
often have expanded their operations onto the network of Deutsche Bahn where
they are exclusively responsible for the provision of downstream services.21 Sec-
ond, sometimes local public transport companies expand their activities into from,
e.g., buses into the railroad sector. Third, some entirely new companies have been
formed. Fourth, some railway operators are joint ventures between other companies,
in some cases including DB Regio.22 Finally, foreign firms have entered the market.
Typically, they have taken over independent local operators; however, there are also
examples of entry on lines that were previously operated by DB Regio.23
2.2 Hypotheses
We shall now introduce the two main hypotheses of the paper.
20A related case concerns the important line Hamburg-Westerland, also in Schleswig-Holstein.
Here, the successful Nord-Ostseebahn entered a very attractive bid, but apparently finds it diﬃcult
to break even. As a remedy, it is playing with the idea of increasing ticket prices for some passengers
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 14/10/2005).
21In Baden-Württemberg, the main pre-reform operators were Südwestdeutsche Eisenbah-
ngesellschaft (SWEG), Württembergische Eisenbahngesellschaft (WEG), Hohenzollerische Lan-
deseisenbahn (HzL), Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) and Oberrheinische Eisenbahnge-
sellschaft (OEG). SWEG, HzL and AVG have expanded their operations onto the Deutsche Bahn
network, partly in joint ventures. OEG still concentrates on its old network; WEG has been taken
over by Connex.
22In Baden-Württemberg, there are no examples of entirely new firms in the market. However,
for instance, the Breisgau S-Bahn was founded jointly by SWEG and the Freiburger Verkehrs AG,
the municipal transportation firm in Freiburg.
23An example of the former case is Connex, a multinational company based in France; an example
of the latter case is the entry of Swiss firms on lines near the border: the state railway SBB near
Basel and its subsidiary Eurothurbo near Lake Constance.
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Hypothesis 1 Competition increases the service level.
This hypothesis reflects the simple intuition that competitive procurement has
two main advantages for the agency. First, it allows to select the most eﬃcient
supplier (selection eﬀect). Second, it puts pressure on all suppliers (competitive-
pressure eﬀect). As a result, with competition, procuring any service level is less
costly than without. Therefore, under reasonable preferences agencies prefer to ask
for higher service levels with competition than without.
Because of the competitive-pressure eﬀect, a positive eﬀect of competition does
not necessarily presuppose that the competitors are more eﬃcient than the incum-
bent. However, if we do observe a change of operator as a result of the introduction
of competition, this suggests that we are in an environment where competition is
stronger (for instance, because there are more bidders) than when the operator does
not change. If the agency has some idea about the strength of competition, it should
ask for higher service levels where it expects competition to be strong. Combining
these two insights leads to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Other things equal, the diﬀerence in service levels demanded by the
agency under direct negotiations and competitive procurement is higher when com-
petition leads to a change of operator than when it does not.
To justify these hypotheses more carefully, we provide an extremely simple model
that captures the essence of the argument. We think of the agency as procuring
services that can potentially be delivered by firms i = 1, ..., I. The agency can
either use direct negotiations with firm 1, the incumbent, or competitive procurement
where all I firms can submit bids. In either case, the agency announces a service
level q in the first stage of the game; in the second stage, a mechanism determines
which firm, provides the service, and which transfer Ti it receives from the agency
for each unit supplied.24 The agency has a utility function U(q) = V (q) − Tiq,
such that V (0) = 0; V is increasing, concave and bounded above. Each firm i has
privately known constant marginal costs ci, which are identically and independently
distributed as F i(ci) ≡ F (ci) from the interval [c, c]; c > 0; with density f such that
f(ci) > 0 in the interior of the interval.
24Though the service level will correspond to the frequency of service in our empirical analysis,
it could also be interpreted as an aggregate that includes contractible aspects of quality such as
reliability, comfort and ticket prices, which are often part of the arrangement between agencies
and contractors.
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We suppose for simplicity that the agency is politically committed to procur-
ing the service with probability 1.25 For direct negotiations, the agency therefore
confronts the incumbent with the desired level of q and a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
T = c for each unit of q supplied. Independently of q, the firm will then provide
the service. The agency thus chooses q so as to maximize (V (q)− cq). The optimal
service level is characterized by V 0(q) = c.
Similarly, to model competitive bidding, we use a first-price auction with reser-
vation price c.26 The equilibrium bids per unit of firms with ci < c are
Bi (ci| c) = ci +
cZ
ci
µ
1− F (c)
1− F (ci)
¶I−1
dc < c.
The mechanism therefore has the following properties.
(M1) An agency that asks for a service level of q in the first stage pays a higher
transfer on expectation (ET (q)) under negotiations than under competitive
bidding.
(M2) Under competitive bidding, the ex-ante winning probability (1I ) for any indi-
vidual firm is higher the lower the number I of bidders.
(M3) Under competitive bidding, an agency that asks for a service level of q in the
first stage pays a higher transfer on expectation the lower the number I of
bidders.
Together, (M1)-(M3) imply the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 immediately follows
from property (M1): an agency that maximizes the expected value of V (q)−ET (q)q
chooses higher q the lower ET (q). In particular, an agency that negotiates with the
incumbent chooses lower service levels than if it procures the service competitively,
other things equal. As to Hypotheses 2, by (M2), like every other bidder, the
incumbent is less likely to win the higher the number of bidders. Conversely, if we
observe that the incumbent wins an auction, it is more likely that the number of
bidders is small.27 Assuming that the agency anticipated a small number of bidders,
however, it will optimally choose a lower service level by (M3).
25See Che (1993) for a similar assumption.
26All standard auctions with optimally set reservation price are equivalent; but a first-price
auction comes closest to actual practice.
27The argument can easily be formalized using Bayes’ Law, assuming that the observer has a
prior distribution on the number of bidders.
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An obvious problem with the approach just described is that the choice between
negotiations and auctions is not endogenized. If competitive procurement system-
atically leads to lower costs for the agency, why does it not always choose this
alternative? There are several responses to this issue. First, industry practioners
often point out the administrative costs of formal tenders. This could easily be
addressed by allowing for a fixed cost of the auction mechanism. This approach
would clearly imply that agencies choose those lines for competitive procurement
where the diﬀerence in expected costs between negotiations and auctions is largest.
If this was the whole story, then the past gains from competition might be larger
than potential future gains from competition. Second, learning may play a role.
Agencies might be uncertain about many aspects of competitive tendering, such as
the reliability of potential contractors, the extent of competition, the best way to
design the auction, etc. Therefore, they could rationally adopt a gradual approach
to the introduction of competitive procurement. Third, obviously, agencies might
have a hidden agenda, which might induce them to refrain from using competition
even when it would be eﬃcient to do so.
A related problem concerns the determination of the service level. Clearly, an
ideal mechanism would attempt to elicit firm’s private information to determine q.
Che (1993) introduces such a mechanism. Agencies ask firms to submit oﬀers (qi, pi),
where pi is the total payment. They specify a scoring rule s(qi, pi) = V (qi)− pi, so
that the firm with the highest score is awarded the contract. Che shows that both
first-score auctions and second-score auctions lead to bids such that the quantity
maximizes V (qi) − ciqi.28 Clearly, this quantity is decreasing in a firm’s marginal
cost; it’s expected value is therefore increasing in the number of firms. Using such
multi-dimensional auctions, Hypotheses 1 and 2 could also be generated.29 We
chose the alternative approach where the agency prescribes the output level because
it appears to be closer to reality.
3 Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses, we first require a measure of the service level. Ideally, such
a measure should aggregate the frequency of service as well as aspects of quality
28The terminology coincides with the more familiar teminology from one-dimensional auctions.
In the first-score auction, the firm’s oﬀer is finalized as a contract; in the second-score auction, the
firm must match the score of the highest rejected oﬀer.
29For negotiations, the relevant mechanism would allow the firm to choose q itself, with a transfer
payment of V (q).
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such as safety, comfort and prices. A good candidate for such a measure would
be the number of passenger kilometers traveled on a line. This measure reflects
the conceived service quality from the perspective of the passengers. Unfortunately,
however, we only have rudimentary data on passenger kilometers, so that we used
a less satisfactory measure, namely the frequency of service. We measure this fre-
quency as the ratio between train kilometers per year (tkm) and the length of a line
(lkm).30 The frequency of service is an important aspect of the service level, but
obviously not the only one.
To identify competition eﬀects, we compare the evolution of the frequency of
service in the group of competitive lines and the control group. We first introduce
a definition for a competitively served line. To understand this definition, it is
important to note that agencies do not necessarily procure all services on one line in
the same fashion. For instance, in some cases, the agencies use competitive bidding
for higher-level services (Regionalexpress), but procure lower level services on the
same level directly from the monopolist, or conversely.
Definition 1 A line is served competitively if, for at least 20% of the train kilo-
meters that were provided on these lines in the year 2003/2004, one of the following
conditions holds:31
(i) The services were procured using a formal tender.
(ii) The services were procured on the basis of oﬀers from at least two firms that
were approached directly by the agency.
(iii) Apart from the incumbent, at least one firm oﬀered a contract to the agency
without having been asked to do so.
(iv) For reasons other than those given under (i)-(iii), the services were carried out
by another firm than the former incumbent DB Regio.
Case (i) is the most important. The largest auction in Germany to date was
carried out by VRN. DB Regio cast the successful bid for the S-Bahn Rhein-Neckar,
a new metro system in the Heidelberg-Mannheim agglomeration, amounting to ap-
proximately 6 Mio. tkm per year (Die Welt 2001). Other major cases of competitive
bidding in Baden-Württemberg included metro lines near Freiburg, Karlsruhe and
30Thus, the frequency of service corresponds to the average number of trains per year on each
kilometer of tracks.
31The 20% cut-oﬀ value to identify competitively procured lines is somewhat arbitrary; as, on
most lines, the following conditions (i)-(iv) hold either for a very small number of services or for
a large number of services, the results are likely to be robust to the exact choice of the cut-oﬀ level.
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Oﬀenburg and the Ringzug, involving 1.258 Mio. tkm per year in the eastern part
of the Black Forest (Hohenzollerische Landesbahn 2001).
Case (ii) is quite common in general, but not in Baden-Württemberg.32
Case (iii) is rare in general, but it happened in Baden-Württemberg on one
occasion: Starting from 2003, the lines Basel SBB — Zell im Wiesental and Weil am
Rhein — Stetten were initially supposed to be served by the incumbent DB Regio
jointly with SBB, the Swiss state railway company. Then SWEG submitted an
unsolicited bid for both lines to which SBB reacted by submitting a bid without DB
Regio (Wirtschafts- und Sozialdepartement Basel-Stadt 2002).
We included category (iv) because it appears plausible that if a firm takes over
the duty of operating a line instead of DB Regio, it believes it can carry out
the service more eﬃciently than the incumbent. A typical example is the line
Schorndorf-Rudersberg near Stuttgart. In 1996, this line was “sold” for DM 1.-
from the infrastructure operator DB Netz to the Württembergische Eisenbahnge-
sellschaft (WEG) which now belongs to the Connex group. The new infrastructure
owner also carries out the services on this line.33
Finally, we should point out that the group of competitive lines was not exclu-
sively served by competitors of DB Regio in the year 2004. When the incumbent
DB Regio won the bid, the line was obviously also included in the category of com-
petitively served lines.
We first start with a simple descriptive approach to the problem. To identify
the eﬀect of competition, we compare the diﬀerence between the distribution of
the frequency of service on the competitively served lines in 2004 and 1994 with
the corresponding frequencies for the control group. Essentially, we speak of a
positive competition eﬀect when the growth in the frequency of service is larger in
the competitive group than in the control group. Underlying this approach is the
assumption that, without the introduction of competition, there would have been
no systematic diﬀerence between the evolution of lines in the competitive group
and those in the control group. However, the approach does not require the initial
distribution of frequencies in the two groups to be similar.
For the simplest version of our investigation, we require the following information:
32For instance, in nearby Bavaria, the agency Bayerische Eisenbahngesellschaft asked five op-
erators directly to submit bids for about 1 Mio tkm on the line Munich-Oberstdorf (Bayerisches
Staatsministerium 2003).
33In this example and several related cases, the new operator is vertically integrated, which is
typically not the case in the other examples. There, the infrastructure is owned by DB Netz,
whereas the services are provided by other firms (except when DB Regio is the successful bidder).
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(1) A division of the passenger railway network in Baden-Württemberg into dis-
joint lines.
(2) The length of each line.
(3) The total train kilometers for each line in the years 1993/94 and 2003/04.
(4) For each line, information on whether it belongs to the competitive group or
to the control group.
Items (1)-(3) were calculated from DB timetables, which involved substantial
eﬀort. We included those lines that were predominantly in the influence sphere of
the agencies NVBW, VRN and VVS.34 The division of the network into lines follows
the 2004 timetable. Some adjustments were necessary, however, to avoid double-
counting of trains. Lines that were closed down between 1994 and 2004 were not
included.
Table 1 summarizes the data. There are 80 lines, 28 of which belong to the com-
petitive category. In terms of length, 39% of the network are served competitively.35
Number of 
Lines
Percentage of 
Lines Line-Kilometers
Percentage of 
Line-Kilometers
Without competition 52 65 2478 61
With competition 28 35 1565 39
Total 80 100 4043 100
Table 1: Local Passenger Lines in Baden-Württemberg
Next, we consider the evolution of frequencies between 1994 and 2004. From
Table 2, we observe:
1. a 29% increase in total transportation
2. a much stronger increase in the competitive group
(45% vs. 22% in the control group);
34A small number of these lines lies partly outside of Baden-Württemberg.
35Recall that on lines we defined as competitively served, not all the services are necessarily
procured in a competitive fashion.
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3. an increase in the number of lines operated at least partly by competitors of
DB Regio from 19 to 39.
1994 2004 %-change
Total tkm (/1000) 65857 85255 29
tkm on lines without competition (/1000) 43769 53199 22
tkm on lines with competition (/1000) 22089 32057 45
tkm with competition (%) 34 38 12
number of NE-lines 19 39 105
percentage of NE-lines 24 49 105
lkm on which NE-operators are active 719 1888 163
% of lkm on which NE-operators are active 18 47 163
number of AVG lines 3 12 300
tkm supplied by AVG (/1000) 3839 15386 301
Notes: NE refers to all operators except Deutsche Bahn (DB). AVG is a NE operator.
Table 2: The Evolution of the Market (Overview)
The aggregate results in Table 2 suggest an increasing importance of competitive
procurement mechanisms. It is unclear, however, whether this eﬀect merely reflects
that a growing number of lines have been exposed to competition or whether the
lines that have been subjected to competition have actually grown faster than others.
4 Results
We now present our main observations about the evolution of the frequency of
service. Before describing the estimation results, we present our results using simple
tables and figures.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
First, we describe the evolution of total transportation.
Result 1 In the period under consideration, the frequency of service in Baden-
Württemberg has increased substantially.
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1994 2004
10th percentile 6.045 6.784
Median 12.815 17.367
90th percentile 28.827 49.413
mean 16.015 21.963
standard deviation 12.145 15.508
Number of lines 80 80
Table 3: Frequency of Service (Service level)
Table 3 compares the main indicators of the distribution of the frequency of
service for 1994 and 2004. The table shows a clear increase in the various percentiles
and the mean.
Figure 1 confirms this result. It shows that the density function for the frequency
of service has moved to the right between 1994 and 2004.36
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Figure 1: The change in the frequency of services (1994 vs. 2004)
36Here and in the following, the graphs were obtained using Epanechnikov kernel density estima-
tors (with bandwidth h = 0.9bσn−1.5, where n is the number of observations, bσ = minnS, IQR1.349o,
S is the standard deviation and IQR the interquartile range).
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Obviously, the change between 1994 and 2004 only reflects an expansive policy;
in itself, it says nothing about an eﬀect of competition. Figures 2 and 3 are more
helpful in this respect. Figure 2 compares the estimated densities of the frequency
of services for the competitive group and the control group in 2004. The figure
suggests the following result.
Result 2 The frequency of services in the competitive group was higher than in the
control group in 2004.
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Figure 2: The frequency of services on competitive and non-competitive lines (2004)
The result corresponds to the observation that the density for the competitive
group lies further to the right than for the control group. Obviously, this observa-
tion does not necessarily imply a competition eﬀect in itself. It is conceivable that
it merely reflects a selection eﬀect, namely that more attractive lines are exposed
to competition more often than less attractive lines. In the concrete example, this
natural suspicion turns out to be unjustified, even though on a considerable fraction
of lines in the competitive group the frequency of service in 1994 was already sub-
stantial, for instance on those lines that were subjected to the competitive bidding
for the Rhein-Neckar metro system or on most of the lines that were taken over by
the Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) in the Karlsruhe area. This eﬀect was
counterbalanced by the fact that many lines in the competitive group had a very
low frequency of service in 1994. The most spectacular example is the line from
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Schorndorf to Rudersberg, on which DB Regio supplied only 4607 tkm/lkm in 1994,
while Connex supplied 15.558 tkm/lkm in 2004.
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Figure 3: Change in the frequency of services on competitive and non-competitive
lines
Figure 3 displays the densities of the change in the frequencies of service between
1994 and 2004 for the competitive and non-competitive lines. Clearly, competitive
procurement corresponded to higher growth in the service level. This means that
competitive lines were not characterized by higher service levels in 1994. Rather,
the fact that the frequency of service is higher on competitive lines compared to
non-competitive lines appears to be a competition eﬀect.
Result 3 On lines that were exposed to competition between 1994 and 2004, the
frequency of services grew more strongly than in the control group.
As argued earlier, we interpret this as a competition eﬀect. When faced with
a set of potential contractors rather than with a monopolist, agencies can ask for
better service levels without necessarily having to pay high transfers.
At this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that our analysis lacks subsidy data.
Thus, we cannot provide direct evidence for greater “value for money” in the pro-
curement of railroad services. For instance, agencies who choose to procure com-
petitively may feel compelled to make sure the public perceives this act as a success
story, in which case they might be prepared to accept high transfers to guarantee
high service levels.
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5 Econometric Analysis
In the following, we shall investigate whether the competition eﬀect suggested by
Result 3 survives under closer scrutiny. We shall first analyze more carefully whether
the lines subjected to competition are diﬀerent from the lines in the control group.
We shall then use these insights to carry out an econometric analysis of the deter-
minants of the change in service levels. Finally, we consider the eﬀects of ownership.
5.1 Selection of Competitive Lines
Observers of the German railway industry frequently complain that the lines that
are procured competitively tend to be “lemons”, that is, unattractive lines with
low service levels and low growth prospects. Our descriptive analysis in the last
section suggests that this is not true for the special case of Baden-Württemberg.
Nevertheless, we now analyze more carefully whether the lines in the treatment
group are indeed systematically diﬀerent from those in the control group.
Most of our explanatory variables relate to the attractiveness of the lines, which
is mostly determined by geography. Specifically we consider the geographic distance
to the nearest city with at least 100,000 inhabitants as a measure of remoteness.
Further, we include the size of both the biggest and the second-biggest city in 1994.
Next, importantly, we consider the population growth between 1994 and 2004 in
the two major cities. If there is a systematic trend diﬀerence between lines in the
competition group and the remaining lines which leads agencies to ask for a greater
service increase in the former group than in the latter, this could well be reflected
in population growth.
In addition, we include a dummy variable to check whether a line is electrified
or not. The prime motivation for doing so is that electrified lines are likely to be
more attractive than lines that are not. Also, one might imagine that agencies are
more reluctant to subject electric lines to competition because one would imagine
that successful bidding by entrants is less likely on these lines. Finally, we include
three agency dummies, taking values of one when the line in question is procured
exclusively by one of the three agencies; the reference case where all agency dummies
are zero thus relates to the situation that several agencies procure the services.
Table 4 gives simple descriptive statistics. The results suggest that there is little
reason to believe that lines with competition are systematically less attractive than
lines without competition in terms of exogenous characteristics. On the one hand,
the lines in the former group tend to be somewhat less attractive in the sense that
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they are less populated and show less population growth. On the other hand, the
competitive lines tend to be less remote, and a much greater percentage of the lines
in the competition group is electrified (64.3 as opposed to 48.1% in the control
group). A probit analysis reported in Table A1 in the Appendix gives a similar
picture.
With 
competition
Without 
competition
Difference
(abs z-Value)
Distance to nearest city (km) 7.857 18.135 -10.277
(-1.838)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000) 166.640 214.781 -48.141
(-1.017)
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000) 41.614 52.099 -10.485
(-0.774)
Population growth in community 1 (%) 2.400 2.970 -0.570
(-0.585)
Population growth in community 2 (%) 3.475 3.446 0.029
(0.029)
Electricity 0.643 0.481 0.162
(1.386)
Length (km) 55.893 47.654 8.239
(0.863)
Agency (Other)
VVS 0.036 0.115 -0.080
(-1.199)
VRN 0.179 0.212 -0.033
(-0.348)
NVBW 0.571 0.442 0.129
(1.097)
Lines 28 52
Notes:
Table 4: Characteristics of Lines by Competition Status in 2004
Community 1 is the largest community, and community 2 is the second 
largest community along the railway line.
The picture presented here is likely to be specific to Baden-Württemberg, where
in essentially all of the major cities a substantial part of the “S-Bahn” (Metro)
traﬃc is procured competitively. This is highly unusual in the rest of Germany,
where there seems to be clearer evidence for the “lemons”-hypothesis.
The results in Table 5 extend the point just made, and they cast even more
doubt on the idea that lines in the competition group are systematically less at-
tractive than lines in the control group. The results allow us to understand what
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the explanatory variables just discussed have to say about diﬀerences in ex-ante
service levels. The first column in the table shows that there is hardly any ex-ante
diﬀerence between lines with and without competition. The second column uses the
additional independent variables discussed in Table 4 as controls. After introducing
them, there is a mild tendency in the direction that competitive lines are slightly
more attractive than those in the control group, but this tendency is weak.
With competition 0.040 0.936
(0.02) (0.35)
Distance to nearest city (km) - -0.034
(0.86)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.023
(1.21)
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.036
(1.51)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) - -1.046
(0.57)
Electricity - 4.807
(1.71)*
Length (km) - 0.017
(0.59)
Agency (Other)
VVS 15.026
(2.19)**
VRN 9.214
(2.88)***
NVBW 4.705
(1.83)*
Constant 16.001 2.268
(8.54)*** (0.61)
F-test, pop. in comm. 1 and 2 - 2.72*
Observations 80 80
R-squared 0.00 0.44
Notes:
Table 5: Explaining Ex ante Differences in Service Level
Dependent Variable: Service Level in 1994
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard 
errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Service level is train kilometers per line kilometers.
Also, the eﬀects of the additional controls on ex-ante service levels are plausible.
First, the significant coeﬃcients suggest that electrified lines and lines that are in
the agglomerations of Stuttgart (VVS) and Heidelberg-Mannheim (VRN) have sub-
stantially higher service levels. Second, though the population-related variables are
not significant individually, they are jointly significant, and their eﬀect is plausible:
The greater the population of each of the two biggest cities on the line, the higher
the ex-ante service levels. Also, the role of the interaction term between population
in community 1 and the length of the line is interesting. Though the coeﬃcient is
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not significant, it suggests that the influence of the population in the largest com-
munity on service levels is smaller when the line is longer. This clearly corresponds
to intuition: A line that connects the largest city in the country, Stuttgart, with
some remote part of the Black Forest should be expected to be served less than a
line that lies almost entirely in the agglomeration.
Summing up, there is no selection eﬀect of competitively procured lines with re-
spect to the characteristics we observe. In a similar vein, the competitively procured
lines are not systematically diﬀerent from the control group in terms of the service
level before the introduction of competition. This is evidence in favor of our main
identifying assumption that lines with competition would have involved in much the
same way as lines without competition if they had not been subjected to competitive
bidding.
5.2 Competition Eﬀects
We now use the control variables just introduced to explain the diﬀerences in the
changes in service levels better. Table 6 contains the results. The first column
essentially restates our earlier observation of a positive competition eﬀect (Result
4). The remaining columns show the eﬀects of introducing control variables.
Consider the second column. Most importantly, lines with high initial popu-
lation in the largest community experience higher growth, and this eﬀect is more
pronounced for shorter lines. The remaining coeﬃcients are insignificant. By adding
two variables relating to the population growth in the biggest and second-biggest
city, the model presented in Column 3 deals with the conjecture that changes in
the service level demanded by the agencies may reflect actual and expected popula-
tion changes. Though indeed service levels seems to grow slightly more rapidly on
the lines expecting greater population growth, the eﬀect is both insignificant and
negligible in size.37
As the first row of Table 6 clearly shows, both of the extended models suggest
that the competition eﬀect is remarkably robust, with the size and significance of the
competition coeﬃcent being almost unchanged in the three diﬀerent models.38 In a
37A one percentage point increase in population growth is associated with an increase in service
quality of 99 train kilometers per line kilometer.
38Note that inference is based on Huber-White standard errors. We have also examined inference
based on standard errors clustered at the agency level. These standard errors are smaller than
the standard errors reported in Table 6. In order to perform a conservative test of significance of
the competition eﬀect, we base inference on standard errors that do not allow for clustering at the
agency level.
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With competition 3.319 3.758 3.825
(1.77)* (2.20)** (2.20)**
Distance to nearest city (km) - 0.022 0.024
(0.83) (0.89)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.021 0.022
(2.18)** (2.28)**
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - -0.003 -0.001
(0.14) (0.03)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) - -0.015 -0.017
(1.42) (1.49)
Electricity - 2.356 2.518
(1.40) (1.54)
Length (km) - -0.025 -0.020
(1.08) (0.83)
Agency (Other)
VVS - -5.049 -5.572
(1.30) (1.34)
VRN - -0.468 -0.291
(0.14) (0.09)
NVBW - -1.062 -1.250
(0.39) (0.45)
Population growth in community 1 - - 0.099
(0.63)
Population growth in community 2 - - 0.119
(0.80)
Constant 4.786 3.233 1.245
(5.19)*** (1.03) (0.44)
F-test, pop. in comm. 1 and 2 -  2.45*  2.73**
Observations 80 80 80
R-squared 0.04 0.25 0.27
Notes:
Table 6: Exploring the Effect of Competition on Service Level
Dependent Variable: Change in Service Level 1994 to 2004
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard errors). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Service level 
is train kilometers per line kilometers.
supplementary analysis that is available on request, we address another robustness
concern. One might be worried that some of the explanatory variables are highly
correlated. Indeed, these concerns are justified. However, we show that excluding
the variables under consideration does not lead to substantial diﬀerences in the
estimates of the competition eﬀect.39
5.3 Operator Eﬀects
The results sketched so far suggest a positive competition eﬀect. However, we have
not yet shown whether competitive pressure suﬃces to generate the eﬀect or whether
a change of the operator is needed. Out of the 28 lines subject to competitive
bidding, 8 lines were won by DB Regio, 7 lines were won by AVG — the largest
39Specifically, the population in the largest community is strongly correlated with population
in community 2, growth of population in community 2, the interaction term between length and
population in the largest community and electrification. In the modified regression, we drop all
but the first variable.
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NE-operator in Baden-Württemberg that operates in the Karlsruhe area— and the
remaining 13 lines were won by smaller NE-operators. Thus, it is not clear whether
a change of ownership from DB Regio to an NE-operator is necessary for an im-
provement in service levels.40
Table 7 is a first step towards disentangling the eﬀects of competition and own-
ership. The left-hand column is identical with the last column in Table 6, that is,
there are no controls for ownership. The right-hand column controls for ownership.
The reference case is a line operated by DB Regio in 2004. In addition, we use two
dummies to distinguish between two types of NE lines, those operated by AVG and
those run by the remaining NE lines. The motivation for doing so is that the AVG
is a particularly large operator, the expansion of which was pushed by local policy.
Our results show that operator eﬀects seem to matter. First, the positive signs
of the pure ownership dummies (AVG and NE other than AVG) suggest that, in
the absence of competition, both types of lines saw stronger growth than the DB
Regio lines; note, however, that neither eﬀect is significant. Second, the interaction
terms show that competition eﬀects are heterogeneous, though the eﬀects are again
not quite significant. For lines operated by AVG, the competition eﬀect is much
stronger than for the baseline case of DB Regio. For the remaining NE-operators,
there is essentially no competition eﬀect.41 By and large, there is not much support
for Hypothesis 2. It does not seem that the competition eﬀect is larger when the
operator changes than when it does not.
6 Summary and Discussion
The preceding results show that there are positive eﬀects of competition for the
passenger railway market on service levels. In this section, we embed our findings
in a broader context and we discuss possible extensions.
40Given the small size of our sample and specifically the fact that there are only 28 members
of the competition group, it is impossible to draw far-reaching conclusions about the relation
between ownership and performance. However, the following observations suggest why such an
analysis might be instructive at the national level.
41The positive overall competition eﬀect of 3.595 and the negative eﬀect of -3.687 captured in
the interaction term “With competition*NE, excl. AVG” essentially cancel out.
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With competition 3.825 3.595
(2.20)** (1.94)*
With competition * operated by AVG - 6.851
(1.30)
With competition* operated by other NE (excl. AVG) - -3.687
(1.20)
Distance to nearest city (km) 0.024 0.060
(0.89) (1.96)*
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) 0.022 0.028
(2.28)** (2.61)**
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) -0.001 0.000
(0.03) (0.00)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) -0.017 -0.016
(1.49) (1.35)
Electricity 2.518 -0.991
(1.54) (0.54)
Length (km) -0.020 -0.008
(0.83) (0.33)
Agency (Other)
VVS -5.572 -3.519
(1.34) (0.88)
VRN -0.291 1.977
(0.09) (0.63)
NVBW -1.250 -0.963
(0.45) (0.37)
Population growth in community 1 0.099 -0.094
(0.63) (0.52)
Population growth in community 2 0.119 0.359
(0.80) (1.84)*
Operator (DB)
AVG - 4.735
(1.32)
NE (excl. AVG) - 3.642
(1.23)
Constant 1.245 -1.413
(0.44) (0.42)
Observations 80 80
R-squared 0.27 0.39
Notes:
Table 7: Competition vs. Ownership
Dependent Variable: Change in Service Level 1994 to 2004
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White 
standard errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Service level is train kilometers per line 
kilometers.
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6.1 Why does Franchising Seem to Work?
Going back at least as far as Williamson (1976), many authors have questioned
whether competitive franchising can work in practice. For instance, Vickers and
Yarrow (1989) have identified three potential pitfalls of franchising, namely inad-
equate contract specification and monitoring, lack of competition and problems of
investment distortions from asset handover.
The main concern resulting from incomplete specification of contracts is that
franchisees might provide ineﬃciently low quality to be able to submit competitive
price bids. Theories of government procurement with incomplete contracts (Hart et
al. 1997) suggest that these concerns would appear to be particularly justified when
competition also leads to privatization, as is often the case in the German railway
sector. However, there is little reason to believe that non-contractible quality has
been reduced as a consequence of competitive franchising and privatization. First,
to the extent that quality problems are contractible, the agencies make ample use of
this opportunity. Indeed, railway operators are often complaining that the detailed
contractual specification of many aspects of quality means that the eﬃciency poten-
tial of competition is not fully exploited.42 Second, concerning those aspects that
are not contractible, reputation mechanisms keep the scope for shirking on quality
under control. Vis-à-vis the agencies, operators have an incentive to develop a rep-
utation for quality to be in a good position in future auctions, including those on
other lines. Vis-à-vis the consumers, operators have an incentive to perform well
as they typically benefit from higher revenues. As a result, it is not surprising that
(possibly biased) anecdotal evidence suggests that, if anything, competition has a
positive eﬀect on patronage.43 Finally, several important aspects of the quality of
railway services, such as safety and punctuality, are only partly under the control
of the operators who are competing for contracts. The network owner plays a much
more important role for these components of quality, as the ill-famed British railway
privatization showed. Also, even where quality problems such as delays are caused
by railway operators in Germany, this appears to be totally unrelated to the in-
42Obviously, as Viscusi et al. (2000, 403) put it, the precise specification of quality runs against
the “minimal role of government” as the “main attraction of franchise bidding”. In his case study of
the competitive bidding for a long-term electronic distribution contract by London Underground,
Littlechild (2002) similarly argues that considerable resources had to be spent on the formulation
and monitoring of the contract to guarantee an eﬃcient functioning of franchise bidding.
43For instance, Allianz pro Schiene (2006) compiles 16 examples of successful regional passenger
lines in Germany, 14 of which are characterized as competitive according to our definition. On
most of these lines, the patronage has grown substantially over the last decade, typically by a
factor of 2-5, which by far exceeds the growth of the frequency of service.
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troduction of competition or to entry of new firms.44 All told, there appears to be
little reason to believe that competition has had an adverse eﬀect on the quality of
service.
With rare exceptions, lack of competition does not appear to have been a problem
so far (Lalive and Schmutzler 2006), but this might change in the future. First,
markets are clearly showing signs of consolidation, with multinational firms taking
over small players. Collusion might therefore become more important. Second, as
franchises are up for renewal, incumbency bias may play an increasing role.
Finally, distortions of investment incentives related to asset handover are partly
circumvented by the long-term nature of many franchises. They are also mitigated
by the fact that the specifity of train operators’ capital is limited, because the market
for rolling stock is reasonably well-developed and most firms can use their material
in more than one franchise area.
Summing up, the agencies appear to be aware of the potential problems, and they
reply by specifying contracts in suﬃcient detail and, in addition, making suppliers
the residual claimants from higher quality.
6.2 Related Franchising Experiences
We briefly compare our findings to related experiments with franchising. Within
the European railway industry, the two other main cases of competitive franchising
concern the passenger railways the U.K. and Sweden. Though both cases diﬀer from
each other and from the German case in important details, there is a widespread
opinion that competition for the market is working. For the U.K., Pollitt and Smith
(2001) and Cowie (2002) report positive eﬃciency eﬀects, Alexandersson and Hultén
(2005) make similar claims for Sweden. Deteriorations in non-contractible quality
do not appear to be an issue inasmuch as train operators are concerned. Quality
problems that have loomed large in the U.K. case have mainly been related to the
network, resulting from ineﬃcent investment incentives for the owner related to ver-
tical separation. To the extent that competition in the downstream sector usually
implies some degree of separation between network ownership and operations, one
might of course argue that network quality deterioration is a hidden cost of compet-
itive franchising. However, such problems would still arise under vertical separation
without competitive franchising.
44For instance, in the period under consideration, the state-owned operator DB Fernverkehr and
Reisen often experienced problems with its long-distance trains, leading to delays that also had
adverse consequences for the punctuality of regional passenger traﬃc.
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Beyond the railway industry, one can point to the substantial experience with
franchising in the bus industry. Hensher and Wallis (2005) summarize the interna-
tional evidence, suggesting that cost savings from competitive tendering are typically
in the order of magnitude of 20-30%. However, the experience is very heterogeneous.
On the one hand, the early phase has been regarded as particularly successful, with
cost reductions of 47% per bus mile in just over ten years (White 2000). On the
other hand, Boitani and Cambini (2006) compile descriptive evidence on Italy, show-
ing very small eﬃciency eﬀects of competitive tendering. They attribute this failure
to a bias of the authorities towards local firms. On priori grounds, one would ex-
pect competition in the railway industry to be more diﬃcult to implement than
in the bus industry, mainly because of the greater need for horizontal and vertical
coordination.
6.3 Limitations and Extensions
There are several limitations of our approach. For instance, one might argue that
the lines in the control group are also subject to some degree of competition, because
DB Regio might fear that uncooperative behavior induces the agency to resort to
competition in the future, or that it reduces its chances to succeed on the competitive
lines. However, this would suggest that our analysis underestimates the eﬀects of
competition. Also, as argued before, the causal relation between competition and
the growth of service can be questioned.
Even though the obvious concern that firms may reduce non-contractible quality
does not seem a major issue in the case at hand, we do not want to overstate the nor-
mative significance of our analysis. Most importantly, we do not analyze whether the
level of federal transfer payments that flows into the operation of regional passenger
railways (around five billion Euros per year) is adequate from a welfare perspective.
Moreover, one might argue that, at least on the more congested lines, additional
passenger services take away scarce capacities which are needed for freight or long-
distance passenger transportation.45 However, our analysis is merely concerned with
whether competitive procurement is a more eﬀective way of achieving the goal of
increasing regional passenger transportation than monopolistic procurement; we do
not discuss the goal itself.
45However, it should be noted that on the majority of lines in our sample there are no severe
capacity problems. Though the network in Germany is much less dense than it was in the heydays
of railway transportation, there has been no equivalent to the ‘Beeching axe’ in the UK which led
to the closure of most rural low-frequency lines in the nineteen sixties.
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In view of the preceding discussion, several important extensions of the paper
suggest themselves. First, one could extend the analysis to the entire country. This
is possible in principle, but labor-intensive. Second, it would be desirable to use
alternative measures of performance. In particular, we shall try to supplement our
analysis at least partly with data on passenger kilometers. This would not only
be useful to improve the analysis of the eﬀects of competition on service levels; it
would also help to understand more about the relation between supply quality and
patronage. At present, however, we are concerned about data limitations. Third, we
would like to to use eﬃciency measures rather than pure output measures. From a
policy perspective, it would be interesting to use data on transfers per line-kilometer.
It will be impossible to obtain data on the changes in transfers at the required
geographical level. Nevertheless, some information on the eﬀects of competition can
be obtained by exploiting the relation between required transfers and the extent of
competitive procurement at the state level.
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7 Appendix
Coeff. M.E.
(z-Value)
Distance to nearest city (km) -0.023 -0.008
(1.86)*
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) -0.003 -0.001
(1.80)*
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) -0.006 -0.002
(1.60)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) -0.057 -0.020
(0.27)
Electricity 1.219 0.407
(2.85)***
Length (km) 0.007 0.002
(1.33)
Agency (Other)
VVS -0.800 -0.229
(1.06)
VRN -0.430 -0.142
(0.83)
NVBW -0.284 -0.101
(0.62)
Constant 0.190
(0.27)
Lines 80
log Likelihood -41.39
Notes:
Table A1: Determinants of Competition (Probit Analysis)
Dependent variable: With competition
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard 
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